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The scheme of the Constitution envisaged that the obligation to impart education to the general public would be the responsibility of the State. Article 41 of the Constitution obligates the State within the limits of its economic capacity to make effective provisions for securing the right to education to certain categories of persons. In terms of Article 54 of the Constitution, the State was obligated to endeavour to provide for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years. In terms of Unni Krishnan1 free education to children up to the age of 14 years has been declared a fundamental right flowing from Article 21.

Since the State was to provide for education for the general public, naturally the State could not cater to the needs of any particular section of citizens whether they belong to the majority or the minority community. No institution for any particular sections of citizens could be set up by the State whether based on religion or language, as that would be anathema to the concept of a secular democratic State.

In any event, in terms of Articles 15 and 29(2) of the Constitution, the State was not entitled to discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language etc. Consequently, in all educational institutions maintained or aided by the State, the State is obligated to impart secular education to all sections of the community.

It was only on 18-6-1951 pursuant to the Constitutional (First Amendment) Act, 1951 by virtue of Section 2 that Article 15(4) of the Constitution was added thereby entitling the State, notwithstanding Article 15(1) and Article 29(2), to make special provisions in educational institutions for the advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. By virtue of the said provision, affirmative action was permitted in respect of the backward communities and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, but the State could not on its own make reservations on grounds of religion or language, as that would have been alien to the concept of a secular State. Women were protected by virtue of Article 15(3) with reference to Article 15, but with reference to Article 29(2) that protection was not necessary.

The reason for Article 30 being found in Chapter III of the Constitution was on account of the fact that the interests of religious and linguistic minorities could be taken care of by giving them the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. A secular State could not be seen to advance the interests of the minority communities alone; and as such, the only way out was to give to the minority communities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice the status of a fundamental right. Though the State could not make reservation, it could certainly allow the minority communities to advance the socio-economic interests of these communities by allowing them a freer hand in the field of education which provides the foundation for the advancement of the socio-economic interests of these communities.

Sub-article (2) of Article 30 disentitles the State to discriminate against minority educational institutions in the matter of granting aid to such institutions. Again, the reason behind this was that a minority educational institution, in the absence of State aid, will be in no position to advance the socio-economic interests of the religious or linguistic minority for which it was set up. Without aid, the right to establish and administer a minority educational institution of its choice would be an empty shell.

In the light of this, to# contend that Article 29(2) disentitles a minority institution to admit members of the minority community is destructive of the right conferred by Article 30 itself. If State aid cannot be denied to such minority educational institutions to make the right an effective means of fulfilling the needs of the minority community, then a fortiori such aid cannot be an instrument for the destruction of the right itself.

Consequently, Article 30(1) of the Constitution represents a classification which is rational, the object of which is to ensure the socio-economic advancement of religious and linguistic minorities by allowing them to set up educational institutions of their choice.

Article 29(2) and Article 30 operate in separate areas, and one has nothing to do with the other, as far as admissions to educational institutions in respect of religious and linguistic minorities are concerned. Article 29(2) is a right guaranteed to a citizen not to be denied admission into any educational institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste etc. Article 30 is a fundamental right of the community which entitles a member of a minority community to be admitted to an educational institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority as part of the fundamental right of the religious or linguistic minority which set up that educational institution. Article 30(1) is, therefore, a right to the community.

If Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) were to operate in the same field, then no member of the minority community would be entitled to be admitted by virtue of Article 30(1) to a minority educational institution, as such admission would per se be violative of Article 29(2), since a member of the non-minority community would be denied admission. Such an interpretation would be destructive of Article 30(1). Also such an interpretation would render the fundamental right otiose and unworkable.

In the absence of Article 30 of the Constitution, religious and linguistic minorities would still have the right to establish educational institutions. Such a right would be on a par with the right of other citizens or sections of citizens to set up educational institutions. The right to set up an educational institution, even if it is not treated as a right conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitution, is really in the nature of a right of a section of citizens in order to advance the cause of their community or the cause of education. In that eventuality, the State could always regulate such liberty with reference to criteria applicable to the establishment of educational institutions. In the absence of Article 30, therefore, religious and linguistic minorities would be treated on a par with any other class of citizens who might wish to set up an educational institution. The liberty to set up such institutions would, therefore, be subject to public interest and reasonable restrictions as also the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution, namely, Article 14, Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) etc.

Consequently, the right or liberty of a section of citizens to set up an educational institution owes its genesis to the functioning of a civilized society.

It can also be contended that just as this Hon'ble Court in Unni Krishnan case1 has held that the right to all children till the age of 14 to receive free education is a right flowing from Article 21, similarly, the right to set up an institution may well be considered part of Article 21, for without it there can be no civilized society. The liberty to set up educational institutions is fundamental to the very existence of civilized society. Of course, such liberty is subject to public interest. Consequently, a religious or linguistic minority could well have, even in the absence of Article 30, set up educational institutions to impart general secular education, the only impediment being that such an institution would only have served the cause of the majority community, since reservations would have been an anathema and would otherwise not have been allowed if the said institutions received aid from the State. This would have resulted in religious and linguistic minorities setting up institutions not for the benefit of the members of their own community but for the benefit of the majority community which would have, in fact, destroyed the very rationale of their existence.

It is, therefore, clear that Article 30 was given the status of a fundamental right to ensure that religious and linguistic minorities could set up educational institutions for the benefit of their own community and that the State could not pass any law which denied the establishment and administration of such institutions by members of the religious and linguistic minorities for the benefit of which they were set up.

The main rationale for inclusion of Article 30 in Part III of the Constitution was to prevent legislation from infringing upon the said fundamental right in any manner whatsoever so as to destroy the content of that right. Article 30's inclusion in Part III prevented the intrusion of the State in interfering with the administration of minority educational institutions.

The real content of the right in Article 30 is the entitlement of the religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer minority educational institutions of their choice. The said expression symbolises the width of the right and the extent of its amplitude. The choice relates to the nature of the educational institutions that may be established from a primary school to an institution of higher learning and even a university. It is for the religious or linguistic minority to consider the needs of the community and exercise the right to choose and thereby establish such educational institutions as would advance the interests of the religious or linguistic minority in the areas so desired.

Such a right, though couched in absolute terms, is subject to regulation only for the betterment of the minority community and for the advancement of its interests. Consequently, such minority educational institution is subject to general welfare legislation and to regulatory controls in the field of sanitation, hygiene, health, morality and the like, for if the minority community were to administer its educational institutions without regard to minimal standards in the field of general welfare legislation, it would not, in fact, result in the advancement of the interests of that community and the right to administer would degenerate to a licence to maladminister. A licence to maladminister is not part of the right enshrined in Article 30.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROPOSITIONS OF MR KAPIL SIBAL, SENIOR ADVOCATE, ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

1. Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution deal with the right to freedom of religion. Article 25(1) entitles all persons to freedom of conscience and the right to freely practise and propagate their religion. This right is, of course, subject to public order, morality and health. Further, in terms of Article 25(2), the State is not prevented from making laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice or to pass a law providing for social welfare and reform.

2. Article 26 gives the right to management to religious denominations or sections thereof entitling such denominations to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes. Such right is also subject to public order, morality and health. It is significant to note that though a religious denomination has under Article 26 the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and the right to own and acquire immovable and movable property, the administration of such property which is acquired by the religious denomination, is subject to law.

3. It is clear, therefore, that though the right to freedom of conscience and propagation of religion is subject only to public order, morality and health, it is not absolute in terms when it comes to secular activity or administration of property of the religious denomination. The State is entitled to enact regulatory restrictions with reference thereto.

4. Articles 27 and 28 embody the principle that the State cannot use its authority to propagate any religion. Consequently, in terms of Article 26, no person can be compelled to pay taxes, the proceeds of which are appropriated for the promotion and maintenance of a particular religion. Article 28, on the other hand, again embodies the principle that the State cannot involve itself with religion. Consequently, an institution maintained by the State cannot impart any religious instruction. In addition, in terms of Article 28(3), no person is required to take part in any religious instructions that may be imparted in an educational institution recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. The moment a private educational institution starts receiving financial aid from the State, it cannot compel students of such institution to attend any form of religious worship or take part in religious instructions.

5. Articles 29 and 30 deal specifically with cultural and educational rights. Article 29(1) applies to the interests of minorities which are not confined to religious or linguistic minorities. The term "minority" used in Article 29 is with reference to a section of citizens, as distinct from the larger whole, who wish to conserve their distinct language, script or culture. To the extent that the said article applies to a section of citizens, the said section of citizens naturally is considered a minority as distinct from the part of which it is a section but not a minority in the sense the said term is used in Article 30. If there is a section of citizens residing in any territory of India having a distinct language and script, it obviously implies that that section of citizens forms a numerical minority with reference to the unit of administration within which it is located. Though it can be contended that a section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture can also belong to the majority community, it is submitted that the need to conserve the majority community's language, script or culture would normally not arise merely because of the fact that that language, script or culture is of the majority and, therefore, needs no effort to conserve. Necessarily, therefore, Article 29(1) would apply to such sections of citizens residing in the territory of India which require their language, script or culture to be conserved and protected.

6. Article 30(1), however, deals specifically with religious and linguistic minorities and, therefore, with the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

7. It is possible that a religious or linguistic minority may set up an institute or institution to conserve its distinct language, script or culture. To that extent, there may be similarity between Article 30(1) and Article 29(1); but Article 29(1) is much wider in terms and applies to all sections of citizens, including religious and linguistic minorities.

8. The following questions require to be answered when dealing with Article 30:

(i) What is the meaning of the term "educational institution" in Article 30?

(ii) What are the parameters of the right of religious minorities to establish educational institutions?

(iii) What are the parameters of the right of linguistic minorities to establish educational institutions?

(iv) What is the meaning and content of the right to establish an educational institution as such term is used in Article 30(1)?

(v) What is the meaning and the content of the right to administer an educational institution as such term is used in Article 30(1)?

(vi) What is the content of the term "of their choice" with reference to both "establishment and administration" of such educational institutions?

9. It is our submission that the content of the right will vary with reference to a religious minority or a linguistic minority. In order to support this submission, the following may be kept in mind:

Broadly, there are three kinds of educational institutions which the religious or linguistic minorities have the right to establish and administer and with reference to which they have a choice as contemplated in the said article. These are:

(a) educational institutions set up by religious and linguistic minorities for primary and secondary education. These institutions may be further sub-categorized:

(i) educational institutions for primary education; and

(ii) educational institutions for secondary education;

(b) educational institutions conferring undergraduate and postgraduate degrees (non-technical and non-vocational) but imparting general secular education; and

(c) institutions imparting technical education and conferring specialised degrees including institutions of higher learning.

10. With reference to institutions for primary and secondary education in the context of a religious minority, it may be stated that it is in the national interest and part of the National Educational Policy that children of all communities are entitled to primary and secondary education. It has now been held in Unni Krishnan case1 that the right to primary education is a fundamental right. Statistically, it can be demonstrated that children of minority communities who are admitted to educational institutions imparting primary education have a higher rate of dropouts, before being admitted to institutions imparting secondary education than members of the majority community. It is, therefore, imperative that students of minority communities should be given greater opportunities to be educated enabling them to enter the stream of college education. In this context, if a religious minority sets up an educational institution to give education to children of its own community enabling them to enter the mainstream of education at the undergraduate level, the right in terms of Article 30 is absolute. In this area, there are no minimum standards because the concept of minimum standards comes in only after a student has passed his/her secondary examination. There can therefore, be no objection in principle to a religious minority setting up an educational institution catering entirely to the needs of the minority community.

11. What about the rights of linguistic minorities? If we read Article 29(1) of the Constitution, any section of citizens residing in any part of the territory of India are entitled to protect their language or script and have a right to conserve the same. Members of the majority community may well be a linguistic minority in a given State and, therefore, entitled to protection under Article 29(1). A religious majority may be a linguistic minority, and to the extent such linguistic minority sets up an educational institution, notwithstanding the fact that it has no direct nexus with the language of such linguistic minority, the right under Article 30 is also available to it. Consequently, a Tamil minority institution for primary and secondary education seeking to educate children in Tamil from Class I to Class XII, is entitled to the protection under Article 30(1) and can admit Tamil students and thus cater to the needs of the Tamil community. This, of course, would apply only to Tamilians outside the State of Tamil Nadu. The Tamil minority is also entitled to set up an educational institution for imparting general secular education and would be entitled to all the protections available to religious minorities, being a linguistic minority.

12. As far as religious minorities are concerned, the same logic will not apply, since religious minorities can set up primary and secondary educational institutions so that the students of their community are in a position to join the mainstream of the undergraduate world.

13. The purpose of the protection under Article 30 is to educate students of the minority community to work them to compete with members of the majority community. It is a fact of life, and the court can take judicial notice of it, that members of the minority community, have not had historically, and do not have the same opportunities as are available to members of the majority community; and if they are required to compete with the majority and seek admission into educational institutions imparting general secular education, they would be left behind. Consequently, the merit principle will be discriminatory qua the minority communities. It is for this reason that the right to establish and administer institutions of their choice is given to religious and linguistic minorities.

14. When a member of a religious minority obtains a BA degree in Economics, History, Literature or, for that matter, Commerce, he is in a position not only to do specialisation in those subjects but also to compete with members of the majority community. To protect the underprivileged and the weaker sections of society, the Constitution provided reservation for the underprivileged, the Backward Classes and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and reservation for women. Instead of reserving seats for the minority communities, the minority communities were granted the right to set up educational institutions of their own thereby catering to their needs. It is in this context that Article 30 must be viewed.

15. A linguistic minority would be entitled to seek the protection of Article 30(1) if it sets up an institution to impart general secular education, even if such linguistic minority belongs to the majority community in India. The Constitution-makers gave this right to all linguistic minorities. Any other interpretation would pervert the purposes of Article 30 engrafted in Part III of the Constitution.

16. Thus "educational institution" in Article 30 must include institutions imparting primary and secondary education, institutions imparting general secular education which are non-technical and non-vocational and institutions which are technical and vocational imparting professional degrees. The definition of "educational institutions" is all-inclusive and nothing in the said article restricts the width of the said expression. If the minority community has to ensure that its members are so educated as to enable them to compete with the members of majority community, then it must necessarily follow that the nature of the course of study has no relevance to the protection under Article 30. If a student of the minority community is to obtain a BA degree to become an economist and compete with students of the majority community, such student may get a degree in Medicine and may become a doctor with the same objective. The logic will apply to vocational colleges as well and a student of the minority community may want to get an Engineering degree and compete with the majority community which also produces engineers. Consequently, the nature of the course has no relevance to the objective to be achieved, which is that the members of the minority community are entitled to protection because in the world of merit they will fall behind. With reference to the Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the protection is enshrined by virtue of the reservation available to them; in the context of minorities it is engrafted as a protection by virtue of the right of the minority communities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

17. Again, with reference to religious minorities, technical institutions catering to the needs of the minority community can be set up. With reference to linguistic minorities, unless their language is a medium of instruction, the protection is not available to the said linguistic minorities.

18. Having submitted the above, the next question for consideration is the meaning of the expression "of their choice" in Article 30(1). If the objective of Article 30(1) is to allow religious and linguistic minorities to establish educational institutions and administer them, then a fortiori such institutions must cater to the needs of their communities. Otherwise the raison d'ˆtre of establishing such institutions vanishes. Such institutions are not established to cater to the needs of the majority community. Consequently, the words "of their choice" imply admission of students of the minority community. The right to admission is the soul of Article 30. Without that right the rationale for setting up such institutions becomes non-existent. If a religious minority establishes an institution catering to the needs of the majority community, then the protection of Article 30(1) is not available.

19. However, the concept of choice will also differ with reference to the needs of the minority community and the objective that they wish to serve. In the case of primary and secondary education, the minority community setting up the institution might have no outsiders or non-minority students in the institution, since they might consider that it is imperative that all children of minority communities must be imparted primary and secondary education. Consequently, the 50% limit held by St. Stephen's College case/judgment2 beyond which aided minority institutions cannot admit students for which the institution is set up, is irrational. No percentage can be fixed. The extent of admission of members of the minority community will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. To that extent alone, St. Stephen's College judgment2 does not lay down the correct law. It is also possible that a minority institution may be set up imparting primary and secondary education for the poorest of the poor within the minority community. That right is also available to a section of the minority community. Consequently, the problem of choice available to the minority community has to be left to it in terms of Article 30(1). Coming to minority communities imparting general secular education for undergraduate and postgraduate courses, the said institutions can be divided into two parts:

(a) those receiving aid; and

(b) those not receiving aid.

There is no difficulty qua institutions not receiving aid, as the minority community has the absolute right subject to maintenance of minimum standards as prescribed by the university to which the minority institutions may be affiliated. Here again, affiliation cannot be used as a sword for the purposes of destroying the right under Article 30(1). The affiliating university cannot say that "you must admit students on the basis of merit alone". As far as aided minority institutions are concerned, again the State cannot insist that the process of admission must be on the basis of merit alone, State aid cannot have strings attached to it. It is part of the fundamental right of the minority institution to receive aid and it cannot be discriminated against on the ground that the institution is managed by a minority based on religion or language. The content of the right cannot vary whether the institution gets aid or does not get aid.

20. As far as catering to the needs of their own community is concerned, the choice of the minority institutions is wide and subject to no restrictions. The minority institutions set up by religious or linguistic minorities may cater to the needs of the minority community only. They may cater to the needs of a section of the minority. However, with reference to admission of students of the majority community, the said minority institution is also entitled to have a rational principle on the basis of which they admit students. Take for example St. Stephen's College2 where this Court upheld the method of admission and did not find it to be discriminatory with reference to the members of majority community. The minority institution should have the choice when admitting students in undergraduate and postgraduate degrees to ensure that the students admitted serve the objective of the institution and carry further the ethos of the institution. In St. Stephen's case2 for example, students of majority community compete with each other after the cut-off point established by the institution and within the meritorious students some leeway is given to the institution to choose students of its choice, even though they may belong to the majority community. What is being imparted at the end is not a professional degree but a degree relating to general secular education. An institution may cater to the middle class of the country; may want students with a particular bent of mind to serve the ethos of the institution. In this context, therefore, the principle of merit is not done away with. Within the meritorious students some choice is given to the minority institution. A minority institution cannot admit a student of the majority community who has got 50% marks in preference to one who gets 90% marks. But if there is a student with 88% marks and another with 90% marks, the institution is given the choice to choose one of the two depending on the kind of students the institution is looking for to fit into the needs of the institution. In any case, the result in a written examination is not the only basis of merit.

21. Coming to the third kind of institution, namely, an institution imparting technical education. Again, the principle that members of the religious minority are entitled to cater to the needs of their own community runs through all kinds of educational institutions and, therefore, to the extent such educational institution caters to the needs of the minority community, the institution may serve the needs of that community alone. But when it comes to admission of students from the majority community, there is hardly a case before this Hon'ble Court in which the minority institution has submitted that students from the majority community may be admitted in their institutions without reference to merit. Most minority institutions have contended that qua admissions to MBBS courses, students would be admitted on the basis of a common entrance examination held by the State or the institutions themselves as far as non-minority students are concerned. However, there may be institutions which may be catering to certain special needs of the community. Take, for example, a nursing college which seeks to inculcate in students a sense of devotion and the necessity to serve selflessly for the needs of the community. A certain institution set up by a religious minority may feel that Catholics and Catholicism can be the foundation of such selfless service and consequently may cater to such students who have a particular bent of mind. A meritorious student in a common entrance test may qualify for admission but may not have that sense of devotion and ethos to serve the rural poor. Consequently, each minority educational institution is entitled to devise a rational basis of admission which, if found to be irrational, may be interfered with by a court of law depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this context, it may be mentioned that if some of the institutions follow such a rational basis of admission, there is no reason to curtail their protection under Article 30(1).

22. It is our submission before this Hon'ble Court that there is no straight-jacket formula which can be applied across the board to all religious and linguistic minority educational institutions uniformally. The question posed by the court are complex and deserve complex solutions rather than a simple solution which is to be applied across the board. The essence, however, is the right of the minority communities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice for the benefit of the minority communities. If that is kept in mind depending on the facts and circumstances of each case and each educational institution, the principles as set out above can be applied.

23. The above interpretation is purposive and consistent with the object for which Article 30 was incorporated in the Constitution and allows the State to interfere in the management of all maladministered minority educational institutions. In any event, the interpretation set forth above does not disentitle the State to regulate religious and linguistic minority educational institutions with reference to maintenance of minimal standards and such other regulations which have no impact on the right of the minority educational institutions to cater to the needs of its community and to admit students of that community and of the majority community with reference to the special needs of the minority educational institutions.

24. (1) Civilized society cannot survive without formal education. Fundamental rights cannot be enjoyed in their full plentitude without equipping citizens with the wherewithal to enforce them. Education is constitutional premise without which the genius of our citizens cannot flower. This applies both to the members of the majority and the minority communities. Members of both the minority and the majority communities, even in the absence of Article 30, would have otherwise been entitled to set up educational institutions of their choice subject to restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. In the absence of Article 30, both members of the majority and the minority communities would have been treated on a par, in matters relating to education with the inclusion of Article 30 in the Constitution, particularly, in Part III of the Constitution, the framers of the Constitution, wanted to bestow on members of the minority community, a right in addition to what they otherwise would have enjoyed along with members of the majority community. In interpreting Article 30, the court cannot start with the constitutional premise of equality. The constitutional premise in Article 30, is that the minority communities are given additional rights and safeguards to achieve the level of equality that would allow them to participate in the mainstream of life. That is why Article 30 is considered to be a facet of equality. That is why Article 30 is an "article of faith". That is why you cannot test the constitutional right under Article 30 on the basis of Article 14 or 29(2) of the Constitution. Article 30(2) is a provision to help minority institutions, additionally, on a non-discriminatory basis to achieve a level of equality so that they can compete with members of the majority community in a secular State. The constitutional premise of Article 30 cannot change merely because the minority institution is unaided or happens to receive aid. Aid given on a non-discriminatory basis cannot persuade the court to interpret Article 30(1) in a manner so as to destroy the right. The right in Article 30(1) must be interpreted in its widest amplitude whether the institution is unaided or aided. The interplay of Article 30 and Article 29(2) cannot result in the destruction of the constitutional guarantee under Article 30(1), merely because the institution receives some aid from the State. Articles 29(2) and 30 defend the minority institution from being discriminated against by the members of the majority community only on the ground set out therein. Courts ought to refrain from interpreting constitutional provisions like statutes. Courts must interpret a constitutional provision to realize its objective. In this context, Article 29(2) and Article 30 must be so interpreted so as to ensure that any extreme interpretation does not result in the destruction of the right.

(2) It is not the case of minority educational institutions that they have a fundamental right to get aid. The fundamental right under Article 30(2) is that minority institutions in the matter of aid cannot be discriminated against. If no aid is given to a particular category of majority institutions, the minority institutions falling in that category cannot have a fundamental right to receive it. However, if a category of educational institutions belonging to the majority community is aided, then minority institutions similarly situated must also get aid because of the non-discriminatory mandate of Article 30(2). That is the only purpose of Article 30(2).

(3) None of the above, of course, applies to unaided institutions. In the case of minority educational institutions, which are unaided, the only regulation to which they might be subjected to is for the maintenance and excellence of standards of education.

25. Facts have been placed before this Hon'ble Court and are part of this compilation as well, which demonstrate the state of education in our country. They also demonstrate the scarcity of funds available with the State and the declining investment in education. Facts have also been placed before this Court demonstrating that in the event, members of the minority community are made to compete with the members of the majority community, their representation in educational institutions becomes abysmally low. This has been done with particular reference to the State of Andhra Pradesh. Making them compete with members of the majority community would amount to perpetuating inequality and destroying the very rationale of Article 30(1). This has been demonstrated in the context of unaided minority educational institutions in Andhra Pradesh after they were subjected to the discipline of the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in Unni Krishnan case1. The minorities and minority educational institutions, therefore, need to be protected - the unaided minority institutions from the logic of Unni Krishnan case1 and aided minority institutions from the logic of the minority judgment in St. Stephen's College case2.

26. Education is fundamental to civil society. Without it, none of the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution can be enjoyed. It is part of the right to life under Article 21. Consequently, everyone has the right to establish educational institutions subject to constitutional provisions and other regulatory measures consistent with those constitutional provisions. Consequently, the right to establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed to every citizen under Articles 21 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

1. Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 Return to Text
2. St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 Return to Text